
Rather, 'open-seas protection' represents a paradigmatic shift: the first formal, national-level policy endorsement of a blue-water navy and the sea-control missions it implies. Nor does it simply expand the range of the existing anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) strategy, which remains strategically defensive and hence little threat to Australia. This is more than a semantic difference or change in nomenclature. The PLA, it notes, 'will gradually shift its focus from 'offshore waters defense' to the combination of 'offshore waters defense' with 'open seas protection.' In particular, China's new White Paper outlines a naval strategy that formally expands the role of China's air and maritime forces. Today, as a basis for defence planning, that threat is finally materialising in the form of China's blue-water navy. The assumption regarding emerging threats seems to have been roughly in line with Justice Potter's famous test for obscenity: 'we'll know it when we see it.' What it failed to offer, at least publicly, was a concrete set of criteria by which the threat could be identified and the expansion process activated. Unfortunately, however, the White Paper didn't quite go all the way. The 1987 Defence White Paper offered a clever solution: build a flexible force comprised of different military capabilities keep a close watch on regional strategic developments, including the lead times on military capabilities and doctrines that could potentially threaten Australia and if and when a more clear threat emerges, expand the existing force to meet the challenge. But such a benign environment has also made things tricky when it comes to discerning what kind of military forces to build. It's been a good problem to have, and one which many countries would be only too happy to trade for their more exacting circumstances. ( Wikipedia.)įor more than seventy years, the defining feature of Australia's strategic environment has been the absence of a threat against which to plan its defence.


Goodway paper full#
For the first time since World War II, a regional state is officially developing the full suite of conventional military capabilities, and now also the doctrine, to pose a direct threat to Australia and its vital interests. Although somewhat overshadowed by heightened tensions in the South China, the document has deep long-term implications for Australian defence. Last week, China's State Council released a new White Paper on Military Strategy.
